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1.0 Introduction  
Starting in the 1990s, the European Commission embarked on an ambitious programme of 
reforms aimed at revitalising Europe’s railways. The context for the reforms was the 
deteriorating performance of rail in terms of modal share, perceived inefficiencies in the 
operations of the incumbent, state-owned national monopolists, and the resulting financial 
implications and need for increased subsidies from the government. Increased competition was 
and is seen as crucial to achieving a turn-around in performance, underpinned by strengthened 
economic regulation and structural unbundling of key railway functions.  
The reforms have been implemented through three Railway Packages in 2001, 2004, and 
2007, with the final stage of opening up passenger markets to competition contained in the 4th 
Railway Package approved in 2016. Importantly, in respect of economic regulation, a recast of 
the First Railway Package was approved in 2012 (European Commission, Directive 
2012/34/EC, “Recast” hereafter). These legislative changes have led to the creation of new 
regulatory bodies with increased powers to act in the European railway sector, thus heralding a 
transformation in rail economic regulatory practice across Europe. The study of the impact of 
the resulting changes in economic regulation on the productive efficiency of rail systems in 
Europe is the focus of this paper. 
There are two mechanisms through which economic regulation could impact on productive 
efficiency. First, direct actions of regulatory bodies influence the operations of regulated rail 
infrastructure managers, ensuring their efficiency in terms of the level of costs, quality of 
service and investment plans. This type of action is strongest in Britain, where the Office of 
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Rail and Road (ORR)1 sets efficiency targets for Network Rail, the company responsible for 
managing the rail infrastructure. Indirect actions seek to prevent discrimination, in part through 
ensuring that the charges paid by train operators to access the rail infrastructure are fair, 
transparent and efficient, with the aim of promoting competition. Greater competition, in turn, 
is expected to have an indirect impact on the productive efficiency of the rail system.  
The literature (for instance, on U.S. railroads) also emphasises the potentially harmful 
effects of excessive or misguided regulation (Burton, 2014; Burton and Sims, 2016; Mayo and 
Sappington, 2016). This evidence underlines the importance of ensuring the minimisation of 
unnecessary or even destructive regulation. However, as suggested by the general regulation 
literature, context is key. Whereas in the US, rail infrastructure is mostly privately owned, and 
there remains some competition between different infrastructure providers, in Europe, rail 
infrastructure is generally a publicly owned monopoly. Also, in European railways there has 
been major concern around the weaknesses of rail regulation, leading to EU legislation ensuring 
independence of regulators previously contained within Transport Ministries. Our focus is 
therefore on studying the impact of giving regulators increased independence and powers to 
drive increased focus on cost efficiency and the promotion of competition. 
Whilst there is an extensive literature studying the impact of rail reforms in Europe (see 
Mizutani et. al., 2015; Smith and Nash, 2014 for reviews), to date the literature has focused on 
studying the cost impact of introducing competition and industry restructuring, most notably in 
the form of horizontal separation (separation of passenger and freight operations) and vertical 
separation (separation of infrastructure and train operations). The major developments in 
legislation and regulatory practice described above have been little studied in the literature. 
Where regulation has been included in previous studies, it has been incidental to a wider study 
                                                          
1 Formerly known as the Office of Rail Regulation, prior to it also taking on a regulatory role in respect of the 
strategic road network.  
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of rail reforms, and has been treated in a simple way (via simple dummy variables, capturing 
whether the regulator is independent or not, based on whether the country has adopted one of 
three types of regulatory model – the Ministry model, special regulatory model or railway 
authority model; see Wetzel, 2008; Friebel et. al., 2010). Thus, previous studies have not been 
able to study the impact of the multiple activities and complex remits of rail regulatory bodies 
in Europe. Further, past studies are limited by characterising regulatory systems according to 
labels (e.g. the type of regulatory model adopted) rather than what regulators do and what 
powers they have. 
Our paper is novel in several respects. Firstly, the empirical analysis includes a multi-
faceted regulation index that better captures the complexity and subtleties of regulatory powers 
and activities in different regimes. This index has been developed by extracting the rail 
regulation data from the well-established IBM and Kirchner Rail Liberalisation Index reports 
(2002; 2004; 2007; 2011). This development takes the analysis beyond previous studies that 
have characterised economic regulation via “yes / no” dummy variables. Secondly, based on 
this index, we are then able to undertake rigorous, econometric testing of the impact of the 
strength of economic regulation on rail system costs for the first time in the literature. Thirdly, 
in relation to the impact of wider reforms, our paper considers a rich cost function specification 
that reflects the complex interrelationships between the effects of industry structure, 
competition, and economic regulation on railway efficiency. The paper thus builds on past 
research on the impact of railway reforms, generating new results with important policy 
implications, particularly concerning the circumstances - linked to other reforms, such as 
vertical separation in which stronger regulation may be beneficial from a cost perspective. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the legislative background to the 
European railway reforms of recent decades. Section 3 reviews the literature on the effects of 
railway reforms. It also includes a review of the literature on what constitutes an “ideal 
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economic regulatory body” as a benchmark against which to evaluate our regulatory index 
variable. Section 4 illustrates the data and methodology, with emphasis on the construction of 
the regulation index. The econometric results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.0 Background on legislation on railway reforms 
Multiple European Directives and two Regulations, four railway packages and one recast 
(regarding the First Railway Package) have shaped the policies defining the modern era for 
European railways. It is useful to distinguish between the early and more recent legislation. In 
the 1990s a start was made on structural unbundling – that is, vertical and horizontal separation 
(see below) - and on setting the rules for participation in the rail industry. However, it is only 
post-2000 that three legislative Railway Packages have built on this earlier progress, to 
liberalise entry into the freight and international passenger sectors and to set clear rules 
regarding structural unbundling, safety and regulation. On regulation, the main changes only 
came about with the Recast; though prior to the Recast there was considerable variation in the 
extent of powers and independence of rail regulators across Europe with substantial changes 
over time prior to 2012 (see Figure 1).  
The Recast was aimed at addressing deficiencies in the regulatory and competitive 
environment. Firstly, new entrants faced barriers to gaining access to the market and the 
protection given to incumbents led to a low level of competition. Secondly, the monitoring 
activities exerted by national regulatory authorities were argued to be inadequate as, in most 
cases, deficiencies in their autonomy, competences and powers became clear. In particular, in 
many cases, regulatory functions were housed within ministerial bodies, limiting the 
independence of the regulator from government, and reducing the ability of the regulator to 
pursue non-discriminatory actions and monitoring of the quality of infrastructure and efficiency 
of infrastructure managers. The latter point is important since governments may wish to restrict 
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funding to railways because of fiscal constraints, and therefore an independent regulator can 
potentially ensure funds available are consistent with the demand placed upon infrastructure 
managers by government. The declining quality of railway infrastructure due to limited funds 
has affected several EU countries.  
The Recast significantly strengthened the powers and independence of regulatory 
authorities. Their remits were extended, encompassing the access to and charging for railway 
services, thus stimulating market entry and preserving fair competition (Article 56). The 
independence of these bodies was increased, requiring autonomy from public entities which 
may pressurise their decisions (Article 55), these typically being government bodies and 
railway undertakings. Also the activities of sanctioning, audit, investigation and appeals 
procedures were strengthened, and greater cross-border collaboration encouraged (Article 57).  
Furthermore, Article 30 opened the possibility for the stipulation and management of 
“contracts” between regulators and infrastructure managers, setting out the role of regulators in 
evaluating the adequacy of funding needed to guarantee the condition and performance of the 
infrastructure for the period of the contract (the legislation also allows this approach to be 
implemented through a contract with government, rather than the regulatory body). Article 56 
introduced stronger powers for regulators in respect of accounting monitoring, conferring the 
possibility of auditing companies’ compliance with accounting requirements as well as 
requiring data from regulated companies.   
These legislative interventions reflect the fact that economic regulation of European 
railways is complex and multi-dimensional. The necessity of investigating this complexity is 
addressed by employing a regulation index, able to capture the multi-dimensional nature of 
economic regulation in railways. As explained in Section 4.1, our regulation index is based on 
the Rail Liberalisation Index reports published by IBM and Kirchner (2002; 2004; 2007; 2011), 
which cover the period 2002-2010. This source provides extensive data and information on the 
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legislative and operational implementation of the first Three Railway Packages in a sample of 
European countries. Whilst the data in our study does not extend as far as 2012 when the Recast 
was finally implemented, as noted above, substantial progress in strengthening the powers and 
independence of regulators nevertheless occurred ahead of 2012 and within the period of our 
sample (see Figure 1). 
 
3.0 Literature review 
Here the relevant literature is first summarised (3.1). EU rail regulator objectives are then 
briefly discussed (3.2) in order to provide the link between the theoretical literature on the 
impact of institutional arrangements on rail efficiency and the empirical model set out in section 
4. 
 
3.1 Summary of relevant literature 
The literature on railway economics has produced many studies attempting to assess the 
impact of railway reforms, reaching diverse conclusions. However, these studies have 
concentrated on changes in railway organisation, designed to increase competition and thus 
reduce costs and increase rail market share (see Mizutani et. al., 2015; Cantos et. al., 2010; 
Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009). 
Turning to the specific literature on regulatory impacts, some studies have taken into 
account the presence of an independent regulator. Where this has been done, since the focus 
has been on other aspects of the reforms, regulation has been measured in a simple way (through 
dummy variables capturing the presence, or not, of an independent regulator), failing to detect 
the multiple activities and complex remit of regulatory bodies. Looking at the findings, Wetzel 
(2008) associates independent regulation with lower costs. Friebel et al. (2010) find similar 
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benefits, especially when this reform is accompanied by sequential reforms involving vertical 
and horizontal unbundling and open access to the market.  
The literature leaves an important gap, namely the in-depth study of the impact of economic 
regulation on rail system costs, going beyond the utilisation of dummy variables to characterise 
the regulatory system. In seeking to specify appropriate regulatory variables it is useful to 
consider what an ideal regulator might look like and how the strength (or not) of economic 
regulation in a particular regime may therefore be measured as compared to this ideal.  
Within the transport area and, indirectly, railways, Table 1 summarises the set of multiple 
ideal characteristics resulting from an OECD Round Table event in 2011 (OECD/ITF 2011). A 
key cornerstone of strong economic regulation is the independence of the regulator from 
political influence. Appropriate human and financial resources move towards this direction and 
help the implementation of autonomous actions by the regulator (as opposed only to being 
reactive), in particular directed at intervening against discriminatory practices. Moreover, the 
regulator’s functions should be conducted with stability and predictability, transparency, 
accountability and cost-effectiveness. Table 1 also highlights system efficiency as a key goal 
of economic regulation; for further details see Benedetto et al. (2017). 
<Table 1 here> 
The above discussion of the characteristics of an ideal regulator should be weighed against 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the adverse impacts of excessive or unintended 
regulation, as mentioned in the introduction; though, as noted, our focus here is on the 
potentially positive impacts of stronger regulatory powers to promote competition and in turn 
the quality and efficiency of European railways. The Recast has sought to empower regulators, 
addressing those ideal characteristics previously described. However, ensuring that regulators 
have clear powers to challenge infrastructure managers on their efficiency performance has so 
far proved difficult in railways; unlike comparable sectors, where regulators have stronger 
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powers of efficiency determination (for instance,  in the energy sector; Haney and Pollitt, 2009, 
2011 and 2013). 
The construction of the regulation index used in our study, based on the Rail Liberalisation 
Index reports (IBM and Kirchner; 2002, 2004, 2007 and 2011), is therefore directed at the 
detection of those drivers which reflect the ideal characteristics discussed above. By comparing 
the aspects of regulatory powers and functions covered by our index (Table 2) with the ideal 
(Table 1) we see that these are closely matched. In particular, the areas related to the 
independence, object, powers and activities of the regulator appear to be adequately covered: 
this is documented by drivers attesting, for example, the transparency of regulatory processes 
and decisions, the possibility of investigating ex officio, and the level of sanctions in place. In 
future research, these drivers may be integrated with measures better able to capture particular 
activities such as the ability to demand data on efficiency and financial performance from 
infrastructure managers, as well as the methodological expertise in analysing this type of data. 
We note that the wider literature on the impact of regulation in other sectors also highlights 
the importance of the multi-faceted nature of economic regulation in a particular sector (see 
Zhang et.al., 2008; Grajek and Roller, 2012). In our study, being able to construct a regulatory 
index, taking account of this complexity, plays a decisive role in the analytical determination 
of the impact of the railway reforms on efficiency. 
 
3.2 EU Rail regulatory objectives 
Regulators of industries may have a variety of objectives in different contexts. Specifically 
with respect to economic regulation, the role of rail regulators in the EU, as set out by the 
legislation noted above, needs to be viewed in the context of the wider aims of EU rail policy, 
namely to introduce within-mode competition. The primary role of rail regulators in Europe is 
therefore to prevent discrimination against new entrants on issues such as track access charges 
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and allocation of capacity in order to develop the competitive market. A secondary, but 
important role for rail regulators is to ensure the efficiency of the monopoly infrastructure 
manager (Nash et. al., 2018), though as noted earlier this role is more developed in some 
countries than others.  
Given these primary objectives of rail regulators, it is pertinent to ask what impact stronger 
regulation has had in improving railway efficiency, both through direct pressure on the 
infrastructure managers, and indirectly through the promotion of competition. 
 
4.0 Data and methodology 
This section covers the construction of the regulation index (4.1), pivotal in this paper. The 
economic rationale behind the model choice will follow (4.2), together with the description of 
the data sources and the remaining variables (4.3).  
 
4.1 Construction of the regulation index 
The IBM and Kirchner studies (2002; 2004; 2007; 2011) provide an overview on the state 
of the liberalisation processes in the European Union countries, formulating rankings in order 
to evaluate which countries are denoted by “advanced”, “scheduled” and “delayed” progress. 
The evidence is summarised by assigning the scores (on a 1 to 10 scale) for progress in different 
areas of reform, broadly clustered into: the legislative transposition of the European directives 
and regulations; the effective implementation of these policies; and the competitive 
characteristics of the markets.  
<Table 2 here> 
To develop our analysis, we extract those drivers which are specifically related to 
regulation, which are then used to construct a new regulation index for each country and time 
period in our sample. Table 2 shows the list of drivers selected. The index includes regulatory 
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drivers and sub-drivers, and relative scores, for a group of countries (17 European states). The 
versions of the reports were published at staggered intervals; hence, the quantitative information 
for the intervening years between reports is estimated through an averaging approach, 
calculating the mean between the values connected to two consecutive studies.  Where changes 
to the scores for certain drivers are greater than a certain threshold (chosen to equal ± 3 points; 
noting that the scores for individual drivers range from 1 to 10, so a 3 point change might be 
considered important), appropriate legislative or operational details have been sought in order 
to determine the reasons underlying these changeovers. When a driver is not present for a 
specific year, the constant scores assumption is instead employed, inserting the value connected 
to the temporally closest report, where that factor is examined.  
In relation to the weights, these are held constant for the entire temporal interval to the ones 
chosen by IBM and Kirchner studies in the most recent report. This choice reflects the 
presumption that, with time, the authors accumulated the necessary experience to design an 
increasingly accurate weighting system. Scores and weights could be seen to be subjective, 
being determined by the reports’ authors, but a degree of subjectivity is inevitable in this type 
of study. It should also be noted that the IBM index is a widely quoted source. It is not clear 
that using different weights would be superior as they would likewise involve (a different) set 
of judgements; and such an approach would distract from our main purpose which is to study 
the impact of regulation on costs, with regulation being measured by the well-established, 
widely-used IBM index2. An alternative approach would have been to include dummy variables 
for different aspects covered by the index. However, from a practical perspective, it would also 
include the addition of many more dummy variables and interactions, which would be 
                                                          
2 The literature offers multiple examples of the level of reliability and reputation achieved by the IBM index. 
Laabsch and Sanner (2012) model modal split in a multivariable design which includes rail industry structure and 
market opening, as measured by the IBM index in the 2007 and 2011 reports. Growitsch and Wetzel (2009) use 
the 2004 IBM index to study the correlation between economies of scope and level of market opening, Wetzel 
(2008) and Cantos et al. (2010) rely on the 2004 IBM index as a source of data for the variables pertaining to the 
structure, third party access, and regulatory bodies within their samples.  
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cumbersome particularly given the other reform variables included in the model and our aim to 
link regulatory power with vertical structure. Further, such an approach risks ignoring the 
complexity and subtlety of rail regulation, including the importance of combinations of 
different regulatory powers. Consideration of the relative impacts of different aspects of the 
regulatory index could be a useful avenue for future research. The range of activities performed 
to construct the regulation index is summarised in Table 3. Figure 1 shows the trends in the 
regulation index for the railway systems in our sample. 
<Table 3 here> 
<Figure 1 here> 
 
4.2 Economic rationale behind the model choice 
We consider the a priori expectations regarding the effects of regulation on costs firstly in 
respect to the effects of regulation when considered on its own; and second, when interacted 
with other reforms. In terms of direct interventions, regulatory control of rail infrastructure 
managers may result in improved cost efficiency, better planning and prioritisation of new 
investment and, more widely, improved quality. At the same time, there is a risk that heavy 
regulation becomes burdensome and could increase costs.  
Indirect actions seek to prevent discrimination, in part through ensuring that the charges 
that train operators pay to access the rail infrastructure are fair, transparent and efficient, with 
the aim of promoting competition. Greater competition, in turn, would be expected to have an 
indirect impact on the productive efficiency of the rail system. That said, on-rail competition 
could in some cases lead to higher costs (for a given traffic level) through loss of economies of 
density. In addition, with regard to the interaction between regulation and competition, when 
actual competition is absent (though permitted by law), regulatory resources targeting the non-
discriminatory practices may appear unjustified from a cost-benefit perspective. 
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Vertical separation represents another structural reform, the effects of which may be viewed 
positively or negatively from the point of view of efficiency. The level of interdependence 
between the infrastructure manager and train operating companies can be particularly high, 
especially when decisions on investments, access and timetabling, and real time operations are 
involved. Here a regulatory body may have an important role to play as an impartial third party 
overseeing the transaction process, ensuring non-discriminatory access to the network, 
particularly where the rail infrastructure manager is part of an integrated or holding company 
structure, and helping to reduce transaction costs created by unbundled configurations. 
However, even a strong regulator may not be able to overcome the potential discriminatory 
behaviour of an integrated incumbent. It may also be argued that, on the contrary, when the 
mechanisms dealing with transactions between different parties, and within the same holding 
company structure, are transparent, the presence of a regulatory third party may be superfluous. 
In summary, there is not a totally clear cut expectation on the impact of stronger and more 
independent regulation on rail system costs, though overall we would expect it to bring about a 
reduction in costs. However, regulation and its impacts will surely be closely interrelated with 
the structural setting and the degree of competition. The results presented below investigate 
these points empirically. 
 
4.3 Data sources and model 
We utilise part of the dataset developed in Mizutani et. al. (2015) and earlier in van de Velde 
et. al. (2012) and Mizutani and Uranishi (2013), which in turn mostly derives from the 
International Union of Railways (UIC), supplemented by data provided by Community of 
European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER) members. A summary data description 
is set out below; for further details see Mizutani et. al. (2015) and van de Velde et. al. (2012). 
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For our analysis we are limited by the period and countries covered by the IBM index. Thus, 
our sample covers 18 European railways for the period 2002-2010 (the sample size is 130; see 
Table 4). Since our focus is on the impact of European legislation, this is appropriate.  
<Table 4 here> 
Turning to the model formulation, we estimate a translog cost function and the associated 
system of cost share equations. For ease of comparison with the rail reform literature, we adopt 
as our starting point two model specifications (in terms of the explanatory variables) utilised in 
Mizutani et. al. (2015). The first is a single-output (total train km; (𝑄)), hedonic model with the 
following hedonic characteristics: passenger revenue share (𝐻𝑃𝑅); passenger load factor (𝐻𝐿𝐹); 
passenger trip length (𝐻𝑃𝑇𝐿); and average freight train length (𝐻𝐹𝑅𝐶). The second is a multiple-
output model, with separate variables for both types of operations (revenue passenger km (𝑄𝑃) 
and revenue tonne km (𝑄𝐹)).  
We also develop a second version of the multiple-output model that we consider better 
reflects the underlying factors describing costs. This model has two separate outputs, but these 
are defined as passenger and freight train km (𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀; 𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀), rather than passenger km and 
freight tonne km. This third model is justified by the consideration that costs produced by the 
formation of the railway outputs are only partially accounted for by measurements centred on 
passenger km and freight tonne km. Train kilometres run are heavily influenced by public 
service obligations in the case of passenger services and the mix of types of traffic in the case 
of both passenger and freight traffic. This third model also retains some of the hedonic 
characteristics of model 1, though with some changes to reflect the different specification of 
the outputs between models 1 and 3. In particular, in model 3 we exclude passenger revenue 
share (𝐻𝑃𝑅) and replace load factor for passenger transport (𝐻𝐿𝐹) with number of cars per 
passenger train (𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶). The removal of 𝐻𝑃𝑅 is justified by the fact that the shares of passenger 
and freight traffic are allowed for directly in the disaggregated train km variables. Replacing 
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load factor of passenger service by train length is justified by the belief that it is the formation 
of the train rather than the number of passengers carried that is the primary influence on costs. 
We consider that this approach enriches the specification to reflect the fact that costs will be 
driven by output characteristics (such as trip length) as well as outputs (disaggregate passenger 
and freight measures).  
The total cost measure is equal to the sum of the total infrastructure costs of the main 
network manager (except in Switzerland where there are two infrastructure companies) and the 
costs incurred by the totality of passenger and freight companies operating on that system. 
While the computation of this cost measure is straightforward for integrated organisations, in 
the case of separated entities, infrastructure charges are subtracted from operator costs (to avoid 
double-counting). In most cases subsidies are included as revenue (therefore not impacting on 
costs), but in previous work (van de Velde et. al., 2012 and Mizutani et al., 2015) it was noted 
that in some cases some subsidies are netted off against depreciation costs and it was not 
possible to fully address this issue in those studies; the issue is however mitigated to some 
extent as the effect will be captured through reduced capital prices. Other issues include the 
question of how to include new entrants to the market which is particularly important in 
countries where new entry is high (for details of the approach taken, see van de Velde et. al., 
2012). The model includes input prices for labour, energy, material and capital (for their 
computation, see Mizutani et al., 2015). Alongside total route length (𝑁), a technology (𝑇) 
variable is included, defined by the percentage of electrified lines. A time trend variable was 
also tested to represent technology (not retained as the preferred model; see also Mizutani and 
Uranishi, 2013).  
Turning to policy variables, our starting point is the inclusion of those variables previously 
tested in the literature, namely: proportion of freight in total revenues (𝑅), measured as the ratio 
of revenues from freight transport to total rail transport revenues; vertical separation (𝐷𝑉𝑠), as 
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compared to vertical integration (𝐷𝑉𝐼) or the holding company (𝐷𝐻𝐶) model
3, and also linking 
this relationship to the degree of traffic intensity on the network – measured by train density 
(𝑉), defined as the number of train km per route-km (per day); horizontal separation of 
passenger and freight services (𝐷𝐻𝑠); the existence (or not) and intensity of passenger 
competition (𝐶𝑀𝑃) and the existence (or not) of freight competition (𝐷𝐶𝐹); and finally, as the 
main contribution of this paper, a multi-faceted regulation index (𝑅𝐸𝐺). The 𝑅𝐸𝐺 variable is 
also interacted with the vertical separation dummy variable to test the link between these two 
important reforms; interactions between regulation and other variables were tested and rejected. 
As in van de Velde et.al. (2012) and Mizutani et. al. (2015), our passenger competition 
measure, 𝐶𝑀𝑃, consists of four dummies (0-1), depicting: no competition; competition is 
legally permitted; up to 10 per cent of the market subject to tendering or open-access; up to 25 
per cent of the market subject to tendering or open-access; through to competition across the 
whole network. By summing the individual dummies, an overall measure is then obtained for 
each railway system. This measure represents an advance compared to the previous literature 
which had not distinguished between differing degrees of competitive entry. The same depth of 
information was not available for the freight markets (see van de Velde et al., 2012), hence a 
simple dummy variable is used in this case (𝐷𝐶𝐹). Descriptive statistics for the key policy 
variables used in this study are set out in Table 5. 
<Table 5 here> 
We do not consider endogeneity to be a problem in this case. Changes in the structure and 
regulation of railways have been driven in part by cross-European directives led by the 
European Commission rather than individual countries. Of course countries have responded in 
                                                          
3 𝐷𝐻𝐶  is the omitted dummy variable. To retain model invariance to the choice of excluded dummy requires an 
interaction term for the excluded dummy (which was dropped on statistical grounds). 
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different ways and at different speeds. Some countries in Europe appear to have a greater 
appetite for market opening reforms than others but such effects are common across network 
industries in general, and there is no evidence that these tendencies relate to underlying 
economic factors facing railways within individual countries. We thus consider the regulatory 
reforms to be driven by factors exogenous to the railways (in line with the previous literature4). 
We also considered the use of fixed effects in the estimation of the models to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity and (related to the above point) to guard against omitted variable bias 
where country-specific factors might be correlated with the regressors (in particular the policy 
variables). However, as also pointed out by Mizutani et al. (2015), in studies of rail reforms 
there is little within variation for some of the key policy variables (particularly with regard to 
vertical structure) which limits the approach. Following the previous literature, the 
heterogeneity between railway systems is instead captured by including variables capturing rail 
characteristics. In our case the use of fixed effects does not in any case greatly impact on the 
conclusions regarding the regulation variables in our preferred model5. 
The econometric model specification (for Model 1 – total train km) is shown below (the 
multiple output models, Models 2 and 3, derive from this specification):  
ln 𝑇𝐶 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑌 ln 𝑄 + ∑ 𝜂𝑓 ln 𝐻𝑓𝑓 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ln 𝑤𝑗 + 𝛾𝑁 ln 𝑁 + 𝜏𝑇𝑇 +𝑗
(
1
2
) 𝛼𝑌𝑌(ln 𝑄)
2 + ∑ 𝛼𝑌𝑗(ln 𝑄)(ln 𝑤𝑗) + 𝛼𝑌𝑁(ln 𝑄)(ln 𝑁) + 𝛼𝑌𝑇(ln 𝑄)(𝑇) +𝑗
(
1
2
) ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘(ln 𝑤𝑗) (ln 𝑤𝑘) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑁(ln 𝑤𝑗)(ln 𝑁) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇(ln 𝑤𝑗) (𝑇) +𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑘
(
1
2
) 𝛾𝑁𝑁(ln 𝑁)
2 + 𝛾𝑁𝑇(ln 𝑁)(𝑇) + (
1
2
) 𝜏𝑇𝑇(𝑇)
2 + (𝛿𝑉𝑆1 + 𝛿𝑉𝑆2 ln 𝑉 + 𝛿𝑉𝑆3 ln 𝑅 +
𝛿𝑉𝑆4 ln 𝑅𝐸𝐺) 𝐷𝑉𝑆 + 𝛿𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑉𝐼 + 𝛿𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐻𝑆 + 𝛿𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐺 + 𝛿𝐶𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑃 + 𝛿𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐶𝐹              (1)                          
                                                    
                                                          
4 See Mizutani et al. (2015), Mizutani and Uranishi (2013), van de Velde et al. (2012) and Friebel et al. (2010). 
5 Though it did produce counter-intuitive coefficients on other variables.  
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As noted, the differences between Models 1-3 relate to the output 𝑄 and hedonic 
specification 𝐻𝑓. Otherwise, the functional form remains the same.  
Linear homogeneity of degree one in input prices is imposed in the usual way via the 
following restrictions: ∑ 𝛽𝑗 = 1, ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘 = 0, ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑁 = 0, ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇 = 0, ∑ 𝛼𝑌𝑗 = 0, ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑗 =𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑗
0, 𝛽𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽𝑘𝑗, 𝛽𝑗𝑁 = 𝛽𝑁𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗𝑇 = 𝛽𝑇𝑗, 𝛼𝑌𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗𝑌 , 𝛼𝑌𝑁 = 𝛼𝑁𝑌, 𝛼𝑌𝑇 = 𝛼𝑇𝑌, 𝛼𝑚𝑛 = 𝛼𝑛𝑚, 𝛼𝑚𝑗 =
𝛼𝑗𝑚, 𝛼𝑚𝑁 = 𝛼𝑁𝑚, 𝛼𝑚𝑇 = 𝛼𝑇𝑚, 𝛾𝑁𝑇 = 𝛾𝑇𝑁. Shephard’s Lemma is applied to the total cost 
function, from which the input share equations are obtained as follows:  
                (Model 1): 𝑠𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛼𝑌𝑗(ln 𝑌) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑘 𝑤𝑘) + 𝛽𝑗𝑁(𝑙𝑛𝑁) + 𝛽𝑗𝑇(𝑇),               (2) 
where 𝑠𝑗: input 𝑗’s share of total cost. The related equations for Models 2 and 3 have the same 
functional form, but include disaggregated measurements of the outputs. 
The system is estimated using the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method. In order 
to facilitate interpretation, each variable is divided by the sample mean.  
 
5.0 Econometric results 
Here we discuss the general statistical properties of the results, focusing on the parameter 
estimates on the policy variables. Policy implications are explored in the last sub-section. 
 
5.1 General statistics properties and production-related variables 
The SUR econometric results are presented in Table 6. We have three basic model 
specifications, which differ based on the outputs and hedonic variables selected. For each of 
these three models we have two variants, first excluding and then including variables capturing 
the presence of competition. Hence, six models are estimated: (i) Case 1 (total train km as the 
single output, with output hedonic characteristics as in Mizutani and Uranishi, 2013); (ii) Case 
2 (two outputs: revenue passenger km and revenue tonne km as in Mizutani and Uranishi  2013); 
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(iii) Case 3 (two outputs: passenger train km and freight train km, together with output hedonic 
characteristic variables); (iv-vi) Cases 4-6 (Cases 1-3 + competition dummies).  
<Table 6 here> 
We prefer the models with disaggregated train km (Cases 3 and 6) based on AIC and BIC 
criteria6. In addition to the imposition of constraints to ensure homogeneity and symmetry 
conditions, monotonicity was tested and verified for all the 6 cases. Global concavity in input 
prices for all cases was tested; the condition holds for around three quarters of the sample (this 
compares favourably to previous studies, such as Mizutani and Uranishi, 2013)7. There is no 
convenient way of imposing global concavity, and doing so may affect the flexibility properties 
of the translog (see for example Coelli et. al., 2005). Further, concavity violations do not 
necessarily imply the lack of an underlying optimisation process (Wales, 1977). 
The coefficients on the outputs, input prices, and control variables are in line with past 
studies. Regarding the hedonic characteristics, passenger travel length (𝐻𝑃𝑇𝐿) and average 
freight train length (𝐻𝐹𝑅𝐶) are expected to increase costs as the results show. Passenger revenue 
share (𝐻𝑃𝑅), included in Cases 1 and 4, is not found to have a significant impact.  
Passenger load factor (𝐻𝐿𝐹) takes an unexpected (and statistically significant) negative sign 
when included (Cases 1 and 4). This measure is computed as passengers per train divided by 
seat capacity. As noted above, in Case 3 (and 6) we replace the load factor variable with a 
measure of train length (𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶) on the basis that it is formation of the train rather than the number 
of passengers carried that is the primary influence on costs. This variable, also unexpectedly, 
takes a negative sign, given the other variables included in the cost function. High load factors 
                                                          
6 AIC and BIC criteria are standard model selection criteria where lower (more negative) values of AIC and BIC 
signal that the model fits the data more closely.  
7 The partial derivatives of the total cost function with respect to output and input factor prices turn out not to be 
negative, therefore satisfying the monotonicity requirements at the sample mean. In relation to the global concavity 
in input prices, for the six cases Hessian matrices were constructed in order to determine whether their eigenvalues 
were nonpositive, as the matrices needed to be negative semi-definite for the whole sample (following the steps 
indicated by Baum and Linz (2009) with regards to related Stata commands). 
20 
 
and longer trains should increase costs, since output is measured in train km. Given the signs 
and sizes of the coefficients on these two variables in the different models, it seems that they 
are picking up a similar effect – perhaps capturing the unit cost reducing impact of economies 
of traffic density (though the latter should be captured through the output specification). The 
inclusion or not of these variables does not affect the policy conclusions for our preferred 
models so we leave these variables in the model.  
In conclusion, multiple-output cases seem to be characterised by higher stability when 
different specifications are considered. In line with the preference to these models accorded by 
Mizutani et al. (2015), and also considering the AIC / BIC criteria, we favour the multiple-
output models (Cases 2, 3, 5 and 6) over single-output models (Cases 1 and 4). Of the 
disaggregated models we prefer Cases 3 and 6, partly because we consider the train length 
variable (𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶) to be a more important cost driver than passenger load factor (𝐻𝐿𝐹), and partly 
based on model fit. The discussion below will further clarify this selection. 
 
5.2 Policy variables 
At a high level our results show that strong economic regulation reduces costs (statistically 
significant). However, the precise mechanism by which this is achieved, and how it relates to 
other reforms, depends on the output / hedonic specification. Considering firstly the models 
without competition variables (Cases 1 to 3), in Case 1, with a single output variable (total train 
km, plus hedonic characteristics), the coefficient on regulation index variable is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. The interpretation is that stronger regulation – as 
measured by the index used in this study – reduces total rail system costs8. In the multiple output 
models (Cases 2 and 3) the effect of regulation occurs only when combined with vertical 
                                                          
8 We avoid giving an elasticity interpretation on the regulation index parameter estimates to avoid indicating an 
unwarranted degree of accuracy with respect to the regulation index measure (given the subjectivity involved in 
its measurement).   
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separation (the coefficient of 𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆 is negative and statistically significant). We also note 
that the overall impact of regulation on cost in Cases 2 and 3 - based on the coefficients on  
𝑅𝐸𝐺 and  𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆 - is negative (significant at the 5 per cent level). Thus, for Case 1, the 
regulation effect occurs irrespective of vertical structure, whereas in Cases 2 and 3 it occurs 
only when combined with vertical separation. 
The findings on the impact of vertical separation and vertical integration (relative to the 
holding company model) confirm the results found in Mizutani et al. (2015). That is, around 
the sample mean, vertical structure does not seem to have much impact. However, as the 
network becomes more intensely used, vertical separation starts to increase costs relative to the 
holding company model (whereas for more lightly used systems, vertical separation reduces 
costs relative to the holding model). This confirmation is important from a European policy 
perspective, since the sample used here is quite different from the one used in the former studies 
(only including European railways), providing further confirmation of the finding of a link 
between the impact of vertical separation and traffic density. Horizontal separation is also found 
to have a strong cost-reducing impact, as in the previous literature. 
With the inclusion of competition variables (Cases 4 to 6) the results are similar, though the 
effects of regulation are reduced (in absolute size and, to a degree, statistical significance). The 
results of Case 4 are very similar to Case 1, where the size, sign and statistical significance of 
the coefficient on the 𝑅𝐸𝐺 variable is largely unaffected. However, for Case 6, as compared to 
Case 3, the coefficient on the interaction variable (𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆) reduces in magnitude and 
statistical significance (from the 1 per cent to the 5 per cent level). The two variables, 𝑅𝐸𝐺 and 
𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆 , are jointly significant at the 10 per cent level, but the p-value for the combined 
impact of regulation deriving from the two parameter estimates is 0.1544.  
Thus, the substantial, differential effect of regulation in vertically separated systems, as 
compared to the holding company model, remains a statistically significant finding (based on 
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the negative and significant coefficient on the 𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆 variable) – that is, regulation is still 
relatively more effective in separated systems. However, the overall cost effect of regulation in 
separated systems, though still negative (sum of the coefficients of 𝑅𝐸𝐺  and 𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆 =  
-0.1402), is no longer statistically significant even at the 10 per cent level. This reduction in the 
statistical significance of the regulation effect in Case 6, compared to Case 3, is expected given 
the potential overlap between the indirect effects of regulation (captured by the 𝑅𝐸𝐺 variable 
and its interactions) and market opening (captured by 𝐶𝑀𝑃 and 𝐷𝐶𝐹).  
In particular, passenger competition (𝐶𝑀𝑃) has its largest (cost reducing) and most 
statistically significant impact on costs in Case 6 (-0.0684; significant at the 1 per cent level). 
This (expected) role for passenger competition is interesting because previous studies have 
tended not to find statistically significant impact of this variable. On the other hand, our findings 
on freight competition are similar to those in the previous literature, where its statistical 
significance borders 5 per cent level only in one occasion (Case 4) and its sign indicates a small 
increasing effect on costs. For completeness, we note that Case 6 also produces similar results 
to Case 3 in respect of the impact of vertical separation, and its link with intensity of usage of 
the network, as well as the cost reducing effect of horizontal separation.  
Overall, we prefer the multi-output models which we think offer a more realistic 
characterisation of the impact of traffic on costs. Further, these models produce plausible policy 
findings: the interaction between regulation and vertical separation is still strongly beneficial 
in terms of efficiency, and its slightly reduced influence allows competition to play a decisive 
role, at least for the passenger sector. As reported previously, this is particularly true for Case 
6 which best demonstrates the benefits from passenger competition (thus our preferred model).  
 
5.3 Policy implications 
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The implications of the results in Case 6 are that vertical separation and strong regulation 
are both needed in order to bring about cost reductions. Consider a situation where the two 
reforms are not implemented together (that is where there is a holding company or fully-
integrated structure). In these contexts, even a strong economic regulator may not always be 
able to decipher the potentially discriminatory web of connections within the holding or 
integrated structure. Indeed, for that reason, in other industries, regulatory bodies have enforced 
full, legal separation (for example, the gas industry in the UK).  
On the other hand, even if vertical separation has been implemented, the absence of a strong 
economic regulator may lead to increased costs due to transaction / misalignment costs and 
because the separated companies in the system are not pressurised on efficiency to the same 
extent they would be with the holding company model or vertical integration (where 
competitive pressure impacts on the firm as a whole, thus also pressuring the infrastructure 
division of the integrated structure). Thus in vertically separated contexts, strong regulation 
may well be needed to guarantee that necessary pressure on the efficiency of infrastructure 
managers that railway operators are not able to exert.  Therefore, both vertical separation and 
regulation seem to function better when associated, as the results show. As a caveat, it should 
be noted that only a few regulators directly act or have the powers to request data on the 
efficiency levels of infrastructure managers in our sample; the beneficial role of regulators in 
vertically separated contexts may therefore be associated primarily with the associated increase 
in operational transparency leading to costs reductions and potentially through enabling 
increased competition (to the extent that this effect is not captured by the competition variables).  
Given our finding of an important interaction between regulation and vertical separation, 
we now consider how our study contributes to the wider debate on the relative cost of separated 
and integrated structures which, according to Mizutani and Uranishi (2013) and Mizutani et al. 
(2015), depends on traffic density. In previous studies, specific train density cut-off points - 
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beyond which vertical separation stops producing beneficial effects on efficiency - have been 
computed. In this study we expand on previous analyses to take account of the strength of 
regulation, categorised into low, mean and high regulation9.  
Figure 2 shows the results. In situations where regulation is weak, vertical separation 
reduces costs when density is less than around 0.38 times the average density level in the sample 
(corresponding to just 26 data-points). Put the other way round, our model predicts that vertical 
separation therefore increases costs for most of the sample when regulation is weak. Increasing 
the strength of regulation to its mean value brings this critical value up to 1.06 times the sample 
average density level (which is the case for 68 observations). This finding suggests that for an 
average railway in terms of train density, and with “average regulation”, the choice of vertical 
structure has little effect on costs; whilst those railways with lower / (higher) than average train 
density would see cost reductions / (increases) respectively as a result of vertical separation. 
Further intensification of regulation (up to its maximum value) augments the critical value for 
density to around 1.29 times its average level, meaning that vertical separation reduces costs 
for 98 observations in the sample, out of 130. Thus, the presence of a strong regulator increases 
the number of railway systems which would benefit from vertical separation (from a cost 
perspective) by moving the density cut-off point over to the right (see Figure 2).  
At mean levels of regulation, the density cut-off point in our study is 1.06 times the sample 
mean, which is similar to that in Mizutani et. al. (2015). Although the sample in our study 
differs from those in previous studies, the average train density levels in the studies are similar. 
Our findings therefore suggest that, at “average” levels of regulation, the density cut-off points 
are not markedly affected and our results confirm those of previous studies. However, the 
presence of a more powerful regulator, together with vertical separation, may greatly contribute 
to reducing costs for a wider range of density levels and in turn railways than previously found. 
                                                          
9 Based on the minimum, mean and maximum values of the 𝑅𝐸𝐺 variable in our sample.  
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<Figure 2 here> 
The emerging story is not a simple one, but the potential for cost-reducing effects from 
regulation are clear in certain circumstances. Regulation seems to have beneficial effects on 
railway efficiency, particularly when associated with vertical separation (and when train density 
levels are not too high), and when employed as instrumental to the creation of competition (in 
passenger in particular). Therefore, the decision whether or when to introduce or strengthen 
regulatory powers seems to be dependent on the degree of (actual or desired) market openness, 
the extent of structural unbundling, and the intensity of usage of the rail network. These inter-
relationships should therefore be taken into account when designing regulatory policy. 
 
6.0 Conclusions 
In recent years European railway regulation has been subject to major reform, with the 
powers, independence and responsibilities of rail regulators strengthened considerably. The 
primary purpose of this paper is to study the impact of economic regulation on rail system costs, 
which is important because of the different approaches adopted across Europe, and the changes 
induced by EU reforms. Further, reforms have continued beyond the period of our sample and 
our study therefore sheds light on the expected impact that these changes could have. 
The unique contribution as compared to the previous literature lies in the incorporation of a 
multi-faceted rail regulation index – that captures the complexity and subtleties of regulatory 
powers and activities – into an econometric framework. Since previous studies have focused on 
dummy variables to capture the presence (or not) of an independent economic regulator, this 
approach enables a richer study of the impact of European regulatory reforms than has been 
attempted previously. As a secondary objective, the research also asks how different reforms 
interact to produce more efficient railways in Europe; in particular focusing on the relationship 
between regulation, vertical separation and competition. We use a panel of 17 European 
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railways (2002-2010), using a dataset based on published International Union of Railways 
(UIC) data, supplemented by data supplied by the European rail industry.  
We find that the presence of strong economic regulation leads to lower rail system costs; 
importantly, in our preferred model, this cost reducing effect occurs only when combined with 
vertical separation. The implication is that vertical separation and strong regulation are both 
needed in order to bring beneficial impacts in the form of cost reductions. With integrated 
structures, even a strong economic regulator may not always be able to fully ensure a level 
playing field for new entrants. On the other hand, even in vertically-separated cases, the absence 
of a strong economic regulator may lead to higher costs resulting from transaction / 
misalignment costs; and strong regulation may be needed to guarantee pressure on the 
efficiency of infrastructure managers that railway operators are not able to exert. Therefore, 
both vertical separation and regulation seem to function better when associated. Our results also 
confirm previous results on the beneficial effects of horizontal separation; and that passenger 
competition reduces costs; previous studies have typically not been able to pick up this latter 
effect. 
The policy implication of our paper is that strengthening the powers, activities and 
independence of regulatory bodies is likely to be beneficial in terms of cost reduction either 
directly or indirectly via competition; but that the benefits may only be felt when implemented 
alongside vertical separation. Likewise, vertical separation, without strong regulation, may be 
ineffective, though the final impact will also depend on the intensity of usage of the network, 
as found in Mizutani et. al. (2015). In this respect, our study shows that the presence of strong 
economic regulation implies that vertical separation may be beneficial (in terms of reducing 
costs) for railways even with higher train density levels than previously envisaged, although it 
remains the case that for very densely trafficked railways a holding company model is to be 
preferred. The inter-relationships between different reform types, and the intensity of network 
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usage, should therefore be taken into account when designing regulatory policy and wider 
reforms.  
There are some limitations that could suggest avenues for future research. The dataset does 
not extend post the finalisation of the 2012 Recast so an updated study would shed light on the 
final impact of these reforms. However, such an update would require new survey work to 
support the extension of the regulation index beyond the period of our sample. Such a survey 
could also consider new work to enhance the drivers covered by the index and to re-consider 
the weights. Consideration of the relative impacts of different aspects of the regulatory index 
could be a useful avenue for future research. Further research is also needed to enable a bottom-
up identification of the areas where (and the conditions through which) regulation, structure 
and competition may interact and produce benefits in terms of railway efficiency. Such research 
would complement the econometric results in this study.  
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Table 1 Summary of Ideal Rail Regulator Characteristics 
Ideal characteristics Purposes 
Independence 
Legislative and operational independence from 
government and railway companies 
Stability and predictability 
Minimising political influence and promoting the 
conditions for long-term planning 
Non-discrimination 
Maintaining a level playing field for operators when 
accessing the infrastructure 
Distinct responsibilities 
Avoiding overlapping of roles and accountability 
between regulator and government (or other 
agencies) 
Human and financial resources 
Appropriate resources and skills to meet regulatory 
objectives 
Transparency Ensuring the accountability of the regulator 
Pro-activity and effectiveness 
Growing autonomous powers for investigations and 
interventions 
System efficiency 
Accessing and analysing data on infrastructure 
managers’ quality and efficiency 
Cost-effectiveness 
The extent to which the regulator delivers its 
functions effectively, given its resources (value for 
money) 
Source: own analysis based on the literature. 
 
 
Table 2 Regulation Index: Drivers and Weights 
Macro-areas Drivers Sub-drivers Weights 
Competence of the 
regulation authority 
General aspects 
of the regulatory 
authority 
Existence of the regulatory authority pursuant to Art. 
30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 
  Transparency of competence of regulatory authority 0.017 
  Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 
  Independence of political influence 0.017 
  Existence of an annual report 0.017 
 
Object of the 
regulation 
Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 
  Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 
  Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 
  Investigations concerning level or structure of user fees 0.022 
  Monitoring competition 0.022 
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Macro-areas Drivers Sub-drivers Weights 
 
Powers of the 
regulatory 
authority 
Can/must start investigations upon request 0.015 
  Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 
  
Legally binding character of regulatory authority 
decisions 
0.029 
  Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 
  Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 
  Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 
  Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante decisions 0.015 
  Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 
  Monitoring processes 0.015 
Administrative 
barriers 
Licensing Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 
  Transparency of licensing process 0.017 
 Safety certificate Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 
  Transparency of issue process 0.012 
 
Homologation of 
vehicles 
Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 
  Transparency of issue process 0.059 
Operational barriers 
Train path access 
conditions 
Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 
  Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 
  Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 
  Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 
  Framework contracts 0.028 
  Transparent and standard train path allocation process 0.039 
 
Infrastructure 
charging system 
Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 
  Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 
  Uniform charging system 0.055 
Total   1.000 
Source: own analysis based on the original source documents (see Section 4 above). 
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Table 3 Activities Performed to Construct the Regulation Index 
1 Collection of the Rail Liberalisation Index reports published in 2002, 2004, 2007 and 2011, in part 
available online, and in part obtained through direct request to Deutsche-Bahn (DB) staff. 
2 Selection of the relevant sub-drivers presented in the studies, for the purpose of identifying a range of 
typical regulatory issues. 
3 Conglomeration of the regulatory data of 17 European countries in a single panel. 
4 Calculation of the regulatory index for each report and each country (4 indices for 17 countries), making 
use of the weights chosen by the authors for the 2011 study, then re-calculated according to the chosen 
set of sub-drivers. 
          Example: The sum of the weights of the selected sub-drivers accounts for 53.8% of the whole Rail 
Liberalisation Index 2011. Within that index, the sub-driver “Existence of the regulatory authority 
pursuant to Art. 30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-discriminatory access)” had a weight of 
0.09%, which corresponds to a 0.17% in our study (see Table 2). 
5 Inclusion of additional data for the gap years; see section 4.1 for further detail.  
6 Identification of the reasons behind the main changes impacting on the scores of specific sub-drivers 
over time. 
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Table 4 Country Networks and Transport (or Rail) Regulatory Bodies 
Country network Interval 
Number of 
observations 
Regulatory body 
Austria (OBB) 2002-2010 9 Schienen-Control Gmbh (monitoring) Schienen-
Control Kommission (complaints) 
Belgium 
(SNCB/NMBS) 
2002-2007 6 Service de Régulation du Transport Ferroviaire 
et de l’Exploitation de l’Aéroport de Bruxelles 
Germany (DBAG) 2002-2010 9 Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railway 
Denmark (DSB) 2002-2007 6 Danish Railway Regulatory Body 
Finland (VR) 2002-2010 9 Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi) 
France (SNCF) 2002-2007 6 Autorité de Régulation des Activités 
Ferroviaires (ARAF) 
Great Britain (TOC) 2002-2009 8 Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) 
Greece (OSE) 2002-2007 6 Regulatory Authority for Railways (RAS) 
Ireland (CIE) 2002-2007 6 No regulatory body 
Italy (FS) 2002-2007 6 Transport Regulation Authority 
Luxembourg (CFL) 2002-2007 6 Institut Luxembourgeois de Régulation 
Netherlands (NS) 2002-2010 9 Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM) 
Norway (NSB) 2002-2009 8 Norwegian Railway Authority 
Portugal (CP) 2002-2007 6 Instituto da Mobilidade e dos Transportes 
terrestres 
URF – Unidade de Regulação Ferroviária 
Spain (RENFE) 2002-2007 6 Comisión Nacional del Mercado y la 
Competencia (CNMC) 
Direccion de Transportes y del Sector Postal 
Subdirección del Sector Ferroviario 
Sweden (SJ) 2002-2007 6 Swedish Transport Authority 
Switzerland (BLS) 2002-2010 9 Railways Arbitration Commission RACO 
Switzerland (SBB 
CFF FFS) 
2002-2010 9 Railways Arbitration Commission RACO 
All observations 2002-2010 130  
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for Key Policy Variables  
Parameters Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
𝐷𝑉𝑆 (vertical separation) Vertical 
separation 
dummy 
(vertical 
separation = 1) 
0.4692 0.5010 0.0000 1.000 
𝐷𝑉𝐼  (vertical integration) Vertical 
integration 
dummy 
(vertical 
integration = 1) 
0.3231 0.4695 0.000 1.000 
𝐷𝐻𝐶  (holding company) Holding 
company 
dummy 
(omitted) 
- - - - 
𝐷𝐻𝑆 (horizontal 
separation) 
Horizontal 
separation 
dummy 
(horizontal 
separation = 1) 
0.3462 0.4776 0.000 1.000 
𝑅𝐸𝐺 (regulation index) Manipulated 
scores from 
Rail 
Liberalisation 
Index reports 
7.30 2.29 1.51 9.85 
𝐶𝑀𝑃 (passenger 
competition) 
Passenger 
competition (0 
= no 
competition, 
1~ 4) 
1.2846 1.2466 0.0000 4.000 
𝐷𝐶𝐹(freight competition) Freight 
competition 
dummy 
(freight 
competition = 
1) 
0.5846 0.4947 0.000 1.000 
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Table 6 Full Econometric Estimation Results 
Parameters Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑄 0.5735*** 
(0.0829) 
- - 
0.6236*** 
(0.0936) 
- - 
𝑄𝑃 
- 
0.1695*** 
(0.0575) 
- - 
0.1840*** 
(0.0577) 
- 
𝑄𝐹  
- 
0.3657*** 
(0.0466) 
- - 
0.3693*** 
(0.0463) 
- 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 
- - 
0.3102*** 
(0.0753) 
- - 
0.3516*** 
(0.0741) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 
- - 
0.2374*** 
(0.0549) 
- - 
0.2567*** 
(0.0549) 
𝐻𝑃𝑅 -0.1941 
(0.1489) 
- - 
-0.1909 
(0.1557) 
- - 
𝐻𝐿𝐹  -0.3608*** 
(0.0599) 
- - 
-0.3073*** 
(0.0664) 
- - 
𝐻𝑃𝑇𝐿 0.1817*** 
(0.0299) 
- 
0.0991** 
(0.0507) 
0.1726*** 
(0.0298) 
- 
0.0950** 
(0.0492) 
𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶  
- - 
-0.3899*** 
(0.0886) 
- - 
-0.4348*** 
(0.0873) 
𝐻𝐹𝑅𝐶  0.0855** 
(0.0445) 
- 
0.3384*** 
(0.0510) 
0.0713 
(0.0456) 
- 
0.2907*** 
(0.0526) 
𝑤𝐿  0.3261*** 
(0.0090) 
0.3373*** 
(0.0078) 
0.3297*** 
(0.0082) 
0.3261*** 
(0.0090) 
0.3367*** 
(0.0078) 
0.3296*** 
(0.0082) 
𝑤𝐸  0.0437*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0452*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0433*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0438*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0454*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0433*** 
(0.0028) 
𝑤𝑀 0.2601*** 
(0.0079) 
0.2578*** 
(0.0073) 
0.2614*** 
(0.0073) 
0.2597*** 
(0.0079) 
0.2574*** 
(0.0073) 
0.2618*** 
(0.0072) 
𝑤𝐾  0.3701*** 
(0.0086) 
0.3597*** 
(0.0088) 
0.3655*** 
(0.0079) 
0.3703*** 
(0.0086) 
0.3605*** 
(0.0088) 
0.3653*** 
(0.0079) 
𝑁 0.4719*** 
(0.0899) 
0.4849*** 
(0.0852) 
0.4794*** 
(0.0962) 
0.4364*** 
(0.0940) 
0.4913*** 
(0.0845) 
0.4663*** 
(0.0936) 
𝑇 0.2816*** 
(0.0626) 
0.0870 
(0.0760) 
0.3999*** 
(0.0882) 
0.3057*** 
(0.0633) 
0.1036 
(0.0758) 
0.4665*** 
(0.0873) 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑄 0.2205 
(0.1500) 
- - 
0.1700 
(0.1497) 
- - 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑄𝑃 
- 
0.3349*** 
(0.0934) 
- - 
0.2765*** 
(0.0980) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑄𝐹 
- 
-0.1362 
(0.1016) 
- - 
-0.1139 
(0.1059) 
- 
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Parameters Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 
- - 
0.3126*** 
(0.1198) 
- - 
0.3674*** 
(0.1199) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 
- - 
-0.0564 
(0.1097) 
- - 
-0.0855 
(0.1076) 
𝑁 ∙ 𝑁 -0.2647 
(0.1737) 
-0.3525 
(0.2324) 
-0.8433*** 
(0.2349) 
-0.4221** 
(0.1902) 
-0.4568** 
(0.2413) 
-0.9455*** 
(0.2282) 
𝑤𝐿 ∙ 𝑤𝐿 0.1476*** 
(0.0196) 
0.1705*** 
(0.0169) 
0.1272*** 
(0.0196) 
0.1472*** 
(0.0195) 
0.1708*** 
(0.0169) 
0.1281*** 
(0.0195) 
𝑤𝐿 ∙ 𝑤𝐸 0.0063 
(0.0070) 
-0.0021 
(0.0069) 
0.0072 
(0.0065) 
0.0063 
(0.0070) 
-0.0022 
(0.0069) 
0.0062 
(0.0064) 
𝑤𝐿 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 -0.0508*** 
(0.0105) 
-0.0559*** 
(0.0088) 
-0.0454*** 
(0.0099) 
-0.0497*** 
(0.0105) 
-0.0563*** 
(0.0088) 
-0.0447*** 
(0.0098) 
𝑤𝐿 ∙ 𝑤𝐾  -0.1031*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.1125*** 
(0.0111) 
-0.0889*** 
(0.0128) 
-0.1037*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.1122*** 
(0.0110) 
-0.0896*** 
(0.0128) 
𝑤𝐸 ∙ 𝑤𝐸 0.0329*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0309*** 
(0.0055) 
0.0341*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0329*** 
(0.0052) 
0.0309*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0343*** 
(0.0048) 
𝑤𝐸 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 -0.0135*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0118*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0134*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0117*** 
(0.0033) 
𝑤𝐸 ∙ 𝑤𝐾  -0.0257*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0207*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0295*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0257*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0206*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0287*** 
(0.0040) 
𝑤𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 0.1002*** 
(0.0092) 
0.1013*** 
(0.0080) 
0.0934*** 
(0.0085) 
0.0988*** 
(0.0092) 
0.1018*** 
(0.0080) 
0.0934*** 
(0.0083) 
𝑤𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐾  -0.0359*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.0373*** 
(0.0075) 
-0.0362*** 
(0.0075) 
-0.0357*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0374*** 
(0.0075) 
-0.0370*** 
(0.0075) 
𝑤𝐾 ∙ 𝑤𝐾  0.1647*** 
(0.0113) 
0.1704*** 
(0.0113) 
0.1546*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.0357*** 
(0.0078) 
0.1702*** 
(0.0113) 
0.1553*** 
(0.0114) 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑤𝐿  0.1545*** 
(0.0188) 
- - 
0.1548*** 
(0.0188) 
- - 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑤𝐸  0.0171*** 
(0.0060) 
- - 
0.0166*** 
(0.0061) 
- - 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 0.0177 
(0.0140) 
- - 
0.0200 
(0.0140) 
- - 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑤𝐾  -0.1894*** 
(0.0160) 
- - 
-0.1915*** 
(0.0160) 
- - 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑁 0.1011 
(0.1557) 
- - 
0.2130 
(0.1644) 
- - 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑇 -0.0945 
(0.0926) 
- - 
-0.0521 
(0.0939) 
- - 
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Parameters Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑄𝐹  
- 
0.0646 
(0.0761) 
- - 
0.0549 
(0.0836) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑤𝐿  
- 
0.1258*** 
(0.0129) 
- - 
0.1258*** 
(0.0129) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑤𝐸  
- 
0.0085** 
(0.0044) 
- - 
0.0086** 
(0.0043) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 
- 
-0.0034 
(0.0103) 
- - 
-0.0038 
(0.0103) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑤𝐾  
- 
-0.1310*** 
(0.0132) 
- - 
-0.1307*** 
(0.0132) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑁 
- 
-0.2448* 
(0.1481) 
- - 
-0.1629 
(0.1561) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑇 
- 
-0.1818* 
(0.1006) 
- - 
-0.1335 
(0.1033) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑤𝐿 
- 
0.0901*** 
(0.0135) 
- - 
0.0902*** 
(0.0135) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑤𝐸  
- 
-0.0033 
(0.0050) 
- - 
-0.0035 
(0.0049) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 
- 
0.0132 
(0.0121) 
- - 
0.0136 
(0.0121) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑤𝐾  
- 
-0.1000*** 
(0.0146) 
- - 
-0.1003 
(0.0146) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑁 
- 
0.2741*** 
(0.0869) 
- - 
0.2763*** 
(0.865) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑇 
- 
0.1421* 
(0.0870) 
- - 
0.1239 
(0.0901) 
- 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 
- - 
-0.1833* 
(0.1073) 
- - 
-0.1914* 
(0.1055) 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐿  
- - 
0.1016*** 
(0.0168) 
- - 
0.1025*** 
(0.0167) 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐸  
- - 
0.0200*** 
(0.0053) 
- - 
0.0195*** 
(0.0052) 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 
- - 
0.0083 
(0.0121) 
- - 
0.0085 
(0.0118) 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐾  
- - 
-0.1299*** 
(0.0144) 
- - 
-0.1305*** 
(0.0144) 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑁 
- - 
0.15478 
(0.1410) 
- - 
0.1822 
(0.1365) 
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Parameters Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑇 
- - 
-0.1450 
(0.0957) 
- - 
-0.1273 
(0.0927) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐿  
- - 
0.0735*** 
(0.0159) 
- - 
0.0739*** 
(0.0158) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐸  
- - 
-0.0107** 
(0.0055) 
- - 
-0.0107** 
(0.0054) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 
- - 
0.0152 
(0.0133) 
- - 
0.0158 
(0.0130) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐾  
- - 
-0.078*** 
(0.0150) 
- - 
-0.0790*** 
(0.0150) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑁 
- - 
0.3768*** 
(0.1273) 
- - 
0.4150*** 
(0.1236) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑇 
- - 
0.1848*** 
(0.0719) 
- - 
0.2075*** 
(0.0699) 
𝑤𝐿 ∙ 𝑁 -0.1627*** 
(0.0176) 
-0.2404*** 
(0.0185) 
-0.1803*** 
(0.0158) 
-0.1626*** 
(0.0175) 
-0.2408*** 
(0.0186) 
-0.1810*** 
(0.0157) 
𝑤𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 -0.0321 
(0.0097) 
-0.0823*** 
(0.0125) 
-0.0574*** 
(0.0111) 
-0.0327*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.0831*** 
(0.0125) 
-0.0584*** 
(0.0111) 
𝑤𝐸 ∙ 𝑁 -0.0111** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0006 
(0.0065) 
-0.0026 
(0.0055) 
-0.0106* 
(0.0058) 
-0.0005 
(0.0064) 
-0.0023 
(0.0053) 
𝑤𝐸 ∙ 𝑇 0.0019 
(0.0034) 
0.0070 
(0.0047) 
0.0099*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0021 
(0.0034) 
0.0073 
(0.0046) 
0.0097*** 
(0.0039) 
𝑤𝑀 ∙ 𝑁 -0.0186 
(0.0136) 
-0.0158 
(0.0154) 
-0.0251* 
(0.0134) 
-0.0210 
(0.0136) 
-0.0156 
(0.0154) 
-0.0257** 
(0.0131) 
𝑤𝑀 ∙ 𝑇 0.0201*** 
(0.0084) 
0.0182* 
(0.0112) 
0.0131 
(0.0096) 
0.0194** 
(0.0084) 
0.0174 
(0.0112) 
0.0135 
(0.0094) 
𝑤𝐾 ∙ 𝑁 0.1924*** 
(0.0153) 
0.2568*** 
(0.0188) 
0.2080*** 
(0.0146) 
0.1942*** 
(0.0153) 
0.2569*** 
(0.0188) 
0.2089*** 
(0.0145) 
𝑤𝐾 ∙ 𝑇 0.0101 
(0.0091) 
0.0570*** 
(0.0133) 
0.0345*** 
(0.0107) 
0.0113 
(0.0091) 
0.0585*** 
(0.0133) 
0.0353*** 
(0.0107) 
𝑁 ∙ 𝑇 0.3283*** 
(0.0972) 
0.0213 
(0.1341) 
0.0024 
(0.1306) 
0.2840*** 
(0.0978) 
-0.0036 
(0.1334) 
0.0129 
(0.1266) 
𝑇 ∙ 𝑇 -0.0766 
(0.0746) 
-0.0851 
(0.1114) 
0.0620 
(0.0802) 
-0.0972 
(0.0748) 
-0.0952 
(0.1140) 
0.0199 
(0.0785) 
𝐷𝑉𝑆 0.0267 
(0.0601) 
-0.1314 
(0.0846) 
-0.1047 
(0.0895) 
0.1041 
(0.0674) 
-0.1108 
(0.0953) 
-0.0169 
(0.0932) 
𝑉 ∙ 𝐷𝑉𝑆 0.3514*** 
(0.1036) 
0.4758*** 
(0.1128) 
0.2359 
(0.1487) 
0.3877*** 
(0.1028) 
0.4915*** 
(0.1185) 
0.3258** 
(0.1469) 
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Parameters Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑅 ∙ 𝐷𝑉𝑆 0.0209 
(0.0609) 
-0.1322** 
(0.0686) 
-0.1087 
(0.0725) 
0.0898 
(0.0664) 
-0.0827 
(0.0767) 
-0.0342 
(0.0739) 
𝐷𝑉𝐼  -0.0098 
(0.0415) 
0.0491 
(0.0383) 
0.0544 
(0.0415) 
0.0022 
(0.0418) 
0.0528 
(0.0381) 
0.0635 
(0.0411) 
𝐷𝐻𝑆 -0.3433*** 
(0.0432) 
-0.2698*** 
(0.0583) 
-0.3756*** 
(0.0556) 
-0.3054*** 
(0.0582) 
-0.1965*** 
(0.0723) 
-0.3041*** 
(0.0617) 
𝑅𝐸𝐺 -0.1232** 
(0.0530) 
0.0613 
(0.0444) 
0.0499 
(0.0525) 
-0.1200** 
(0.0529) 
0.0823* 
(0.0461) 
0.0741 
(0.0527) 
𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∙ 𝐷𝑉𝑆 0.0423 
(0.0937) 
-0.2412*** 
(0.0840) 
-0.3278*** 
(0.0966) 
0.0840 
(0.1047) 
-0.1515 
(00964) 
-0.2143** 
(0.1041) 
𝐶𝑀𝑃 
- - - 
-0.0414* 
(0.0250) 
-0.0338** 
(0.0176) 
-0.0684*** 
(0.0210) 
𝐷𝐶𝐹  
- - - 
0.0661** 
(0.0334) 
-0.0048 
(0.0351) 
0.0584* 
(0.0336) 
𝐶0 0.2554*** 
(0.0530) 
0.2794*** 
(0.0444) 
0.2947*** 
(0.0301) 
0.2508*** 
(0.0442) 
0.3240*** 
(0.0417) 
0.3200*** 
(0.0417) 
Log of likelihood 800.086 812.099 823.518 801.493 813.473 826.862 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.991 0.991 0.989 0.991 0.991 0.990 
AIC -1522.172 -1538.197 -1555.036 -1520.986 -1536.944 -1557.725 
BIC -1410.338 -1414.893 -1423.129 -1403.417 -1407.905 -1420.083 
Number of observations 130 130 130 130 130 130 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  Regulation Index Trends for Top, Average and Lower Quartile in the Sample (2002-2011) 
Source: own analysis based on the original source documents (see section 4 above). 
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Figure 2 Cost Difference between Vertical Separation Interacted with Minimum, Mean and Maximum Levels of 
Regulation and Holding Company, and its Relationship with Train Density 
Source: own analysis based on the econometric estimations. 
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